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Abstract 
Violations to our sense of meaning have traditionally been thought of as a source of anxiety and 
threat. However, meaning violations can also be a source of humour, as is evidenced by their 
abundant use within comedy in the form of absurd humour. The present study investigated this 
apparent paradox by examining the effects of expecting absurdity and perceiving an intention to 
be funny on humour ratings of absurd jokes. The roles of various individual differences were 
also investigated. Results indicated that expecting absurdity increased funniness of the first 
absurd joke encountered. Perceived intention to be funny did not affect funniness ratings. When 
controlling for individual differences, there was also a significant interaction between 
Expectation and Intention, although the direction of this effect differed depending on which 
individual difference was controlled. 
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EXPECTATION, INTENTION, AND ABSURDITY 1 
The Effect of Expectation and Intention on the Appreciation 
of Absurd Humour 
Humans naturally seek to reduce uncertainty in their environment (Hirsh, Mar, & 
Peterson, 2012)
1
. One means of doing so is to establish consistent, coherent, and reliable 
associations, which collectively form “meaning.” Identifying meaning in our environment 
facilitates interactions with our surroundings and makes the world a more predictable place. 
Because we rely on these associations to reduce uncertainty and inform our behaviour, violations 
to them represent a distinct problem. Philosophers such as Camus and Kierkegaard thought that 
meaning violations were reminders that our associations of meaning are actually spurious and 
that existence is in fact meaningless (Camus, 1942/1955; Kierkegaard, 1843/1945); this is a 
possibility that most find quite troubling. Recent psychological models, such as the Meaning 
Maintenance Model (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006), have also conceived of meaning violations 
as a source of threat that increases arousal and induces anxiety. In both philosophy and 
psychology, the focus has been on how meaning violations are perceived as threatening, eliciting 
a negative or defensive response. However, one response to meaning violations has gone largely 
unstudied: that of mirth.  
  
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that although uncertainty is generally thought of as aversive (Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012), its 
effect is not always strictly and uniformly unpleasant. For example, individuals who were uncertain about the prize 
for a winning raffle ticket that was misplaced were less upset than individuals who knew the prize for the misplaced 
winning raffle ticket (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2006). However, in other cases, uncertainty about negative outcomes 
is experienced as more unpleasant. For example, individuals with a negative self-perception prefer to have that 
perception verified, rather than receiving contradictory complimentary information (Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & 
Giesler, 1992). It is not immediately clear why the effect of uncertainty diverges in this way, but for the purposes of 
this study it is sufficient to note that uncertainty is typically regarded as aversive, regardless of whether the uncertain 
outcome is positive or negative.   
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Meaning Violations and Humour 
There are some meaning violations that tend to elicit both feelings of threat and the 
experience of mirth. In particular, absurd humour tends to elicit this mixed response. Absurdity 
refers to information that is illogical, irrational, or strange. It acts as a meaning violation by 
disrupting our expectations of a coherent and consistent world. Although absurdity should elicit a 
threat response, it is often found to be humorous, as is evidenced by its abundant use within 
comedy in the form of absurd humour. Absurd humour is even considered its own distinct 
category, one that employs specific tropes to produce mirth. These tropes include illogical 
situations, inexplicable events and behaviours, and non-sequiturs. Absurd humor has attained 
great popularity across a number of different media and throughout history, including novels 
(e.g., Douglas Adams’ The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy), theatre (e.g., Eugène Ionesco’s 
The Bald Soprano), and film and television (e.g., Monty Python as well as Tim and Eric). 
Additionally, certain Internet communities, such as Weird Twitter, have come together based 
entirely on a shared interest in crafting absurd jokes. Thus, it seems clear that absurdity can be 
funny under certain circumstances and perhaps for certain types of people, despite the fact that it 
is a form of meaning violation. Given that much of psychology and philosophy has focused on 
how meaning violations are threatening, the present study aims to investigate this puzzling and 
understudied mirth reaction to absurdity in the form of absurd humour. 
Humour 
The transmission and perception of humour are ubiquitous aspects of human 
communication (Gervais & Wilson, 2005; Weisfeld, 1993; Wyer & Collins, 1992). Humour can 
be used to attract mates (Buss & Barnes, 1986; Lippa, 2007), improve our mood (Martin, 2001), 
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cope with stress (Lefcourt et al., 1997), and increase our workplace efficacy (Mesmer-Magnus, 
Glew, & Viswesvaran, 2012). Furthermore, comedy is a highly-popular genre of movies and 
television, and so humour is evidently also a highly-prevalent theme in popular media. 
Reflecting the fact that humour is such a common and significant aspect of human behaviour, it 
is also an important area of psychological research.   
Much of the research on the perception of humour has conceived of it as being a two-
stage process (Suls, 1972; 1983). First, an incongruity is encountered in the form of something 
surprising or illogical. Next, the incongruity is resolved by reassessing the incongruity using 
either new information presented or information from memory. Humour is thought to result from 
this resolution of incongruity (Suls, 1972; 1983). For example, consider the following joke: 
“Two fish are in a tank. One says to the other, ‘Do you know how to drive this thing?’” 
Incongruity is introduced right at the end of this joke, when one ponders how one could possibly 
drive a fish tank. This incongruity is then resolved when one realises that the word “tank” has 
multiple meanings and that, in this case, “tank” refers to a vehicle and not a container for fish. 
The perception of humour and its concomitant mirth response results from the resolution of this 
incongruity. Humour theories based on this general idea are known as incongruity-resolution 
theories. However, not all jokes are as easily explained by incongruity-resolution theories. A 
distinct feature of absurd humour is that its incongruities cannot be resolved. Consider the 
following joke: “A wise old man told me the things that matter the most are the things that matter 
the least. Later we found out he was just a pile of hair.” Incongruity is introduced when the 
speaker says that what he thought was an old man was actually a pile of hair. This incongruity is 
not resolved either by any further information provided by the joke or any additional semantic 
information we can draw upon. In this way, this absurd joke appears to follow a different 
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structure than most typical forms of humour that rely upon incongruity resolution. Rather than 
resolve an incongruity to introduce humour, incongruity that remains unresolved or 
unsatisfactorily resolved forms the basis of this kind of humour. 
The prevalence of humour that does not rely upon incongruity resolution has been 
confirmed by a number of large-scale empirical investigations. Ruch (1981, as cited in Ruch, 
1992) had participants rate an array of jokes from a variety of sources on funniness. A factor 
analysis was then conducted on these ratings. He found that three different categories of jokes 
emerged: jokes based on the resolution of incongruity, jokes whose incongruity cannot be fully 
resolved, and jokes whose content was sexual. Ruch (1992) has dubbed jokes whose incongruity 
cannot be fully resolved “nonsense humour.” Whether nonsense humour is distinct from our 
conception of absurd humour, and how the two differ, is not immediately clear. However, both 
describe a type of humour that, unlike other forms of humour, does not fully resolve the 
incongruities it presents. Thus, research on nonsense humour should be informative in our 
investigation of absurd humour. Unfortunately, research on nonsense humour is somewhat 
limited. Although nonsense humour has been identified as a highly-prevalent category of 
humour, the majority of humour research has focused on incongruity-resolution humour. Of the 
research on nonsense humour that has been conducted, most of it has focused on predictors of 
appreciation.
2
 For example, self-reported preference for complex and unconventional forms of 
humour positively predicted higher funniness ratings of nonsense humour and lower funniness 
ratings of incongruity-resolution humour (unpublished data cited in Ruch, 1992). Similarly, 
motivation to seek out and appreciate novel stimuli also positively predicts funniness ratings of 
nonsense humour (Ruch, 1988). Appreciation for nonsense humour has also been shown to 
                                                 
2
However, attempts to predict appreciation of nonsense humour using individual differences have generally been 
less successful than when predicting appreciation for incongruity-resolution humour (Ruch, 1992). 
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progressively decrease after the late teenage years (Ruch et al., 1990). Although these findings 
on nonsense humour do not directly address the paradox of why something inherently 
threatening is perceived as funny, they do help to describe the population that appreciates this 
type of humour. By viewing nonsense and absurd humour as highly-related forms of humour, we 
used these findings to inform the design of the present study. In addition, a recently developed 
theory of humour also provides a useful framework for investigating absurd humour: the Benign 
Violation Theory of humour. 
Benign Violation Theory of Humour 
A possible guide to understanding how meaning violations could elicit mirth is a recent 
model of humour that conceives of threat as a crucial element. Known as the Benign Violation 
Theory of humour, it predicts that something is funny when (and only when) it is simultaneously 
perceived to be both threatening and benign (McGraw & Warren, 2010). If something is 
perceived to be genuinely threatening (malign), one does not find it funny. Additionally, this 
theory posits that something cannot be funny when no threat is present, when things are purely 
benign. Absurd humour would seem to fit this bill perfectly, as it provides a threat in terms of a 
meaning violation but presents this threat within the safe confines of a humorous context. This 
idea that humour relies on threat is also not completely without precedent. Other theories of 
humour, such as incongruity resolution theories, posit the necessity of a meaning violation of 
some sort, with the resolution of this violation providing a removal of the threat and thus 
producing humour (e.g., Attardo, 1997; Suls, 1972). The Benign Violation Theory modifies these 
theories slightly by suggesting that anything that threatens someone’s sense of how things “ought 
to be” will be seen as funny if it is simultaneously benign. In this way, the theory may offer a 
compelling account for why absurd humour can be perceived as funny. Because absurdity acts as 
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a meaning violation (which is a source of threat), the Benign Violation Theory predicts that this 
absurdity will only be perceived as funny if it is simultaneously perceived as benign. Following 
this logic, it seems reasonable to assume that anything that reduces the threat of absurdity should 
help to increase the likelihood of it being perceived as funny. 
The Benign Violation Theory of humour has received some empirical support. McGraw 
and Warren (2010) have shown that norm violations are perceived as funnier when they are seen 
as both a violation and benign rather than strictly one or the other. For example, a story in which 
a man snorted the cremated ashes of his father was rated as funnier when participants reported 
being able to interpret the story as both “wrong” and “not wrong.” Similarly, they found that 
individuals who were less dedicated to a violated norm or those who felt more psychologically 
distanced from it rated a vignette based on this norm being violated as funnier (McGraw & 
Warren, 2010). For example, participants who were not churchgoers were more likely to be 
amused by a news story about a church raffling off a Hummer SUV than were churchgoers. 
These studies support the notion that violations can be made funnier by encouraging the 
perception of them as benign. Furthermore, they show that individual differences can affect the 
level of threat experienced in response to a violation. More recent studies have attempted to rule 
out traditional incongruity-resolution as a possible explanation for these effects. For example, in 
one study participants were shown a video of a man either falling while pole-vaulting or 
successfully pole-vaulting (Warren & McGraw, 2016). Participants found the failure to be 
funnier, regardless of whether they were told to expect a successful or botched pole-vault. This 
suggests that it is the presence of a violation, and not surprise or expectation violation (an 
incongruous result) that is responsible for the perception of humour. These data therefore lie in 
contrast to the accounts of incongruity-resolution theories, which typically consider surprise to 
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be a crucial aspect of humour (Nerhardt, 1976). In another study, a confederate posing as a 
fellow participant either passed candy or threw candy at participants, explaining the behaviour 
either beforehand or afterward (Warren & McGraw, 2016). Participants found the experience 
funnier when candy was thrown at them as opposed to it being passed. They also found it funnier 
when the behaviour was explained beforehand rather than afterward. These findings also 
contradict incongruity theories of humour, which typically suggest that surprise is a necessary 
condition of humour. In contrast, these data suggest that a violation (i.e., a stranger throwing 
candy at you) can be perceived as funny when it is rendered benign by a preceding explanation. 
Furthermore, they show that aspects of context, such as expectation, play a role in determining 
whether something is perceived as benign.  
The present study examined the possibility that absurd jokes can be made funnier by 
reducing the degree of the violation contained within them. Furthermore, context and individual 
differences were considered as potential ways of reducing the threat of absurd jokes and 
increasing the likelihood of absurdity being perceived as humorous. In doing so, this 
investigation hopes to bring about greater understanding of why threatening meaning violations 
are sometimes seen as humorous. In addition, this study will also test the tenets of the Benign 
Violation Theory as a valid account of absurd humour. 
Individual Differences and Absurdity 
There are a number of ways to reduce how much threat is perceived upon encountering 
absurdity. One factor that should affect the level of perceived threat is individual differences in 
the tolerance of meaning violations. People vary in the degree to which uncertainty and other 
indications of meaning violations are found to be troubling, with several well-studied traits 
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ascribed to these differences. For example, personality traits that describe a tendency to approach 
and appreciate both novelty and uncertainty should predict lower levels of perceived threat for 
violations of meaning (Ruch, 1988; Ruch & Hehl, 1983). These traits include Openness/Intellect 
from the Big Five model of personality (John & Srivastava, 1999) along with Intolerance for 
Uncertainty (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), Need for Cognition 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)
3
, and Need for Closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Similarly, traits 
that describe a tendency to react negatively to rule violations, such as the Big Five traits of 
Conscientiousness and Neuroticism, should also play a role. McGraw and Warren (2010) showed 
that individuals who were less likely to feel that a violation was benign were also less likely to 
find that violation funny. In a similar fashion, individuals who react more negatively to rule 
violations should be less likely to find these violations benign and thus also less likely to find 
them funny. In contrast, those who appreciate novelty and are not inherently bothered by the 
breaking of norms or rules should be more likely to find absurdity humorous rather than 
threatening. Data collected in our lab have supported the idea that these traits play a role in how 
absurdity is perceived (Quinlan et al., in prep.). 
Expectation and Absurdity 
 Aside from individual differences, context is another important factor that may affect 
how much threat is perceived in absurdity (Mitchell, Graesser, & Louwerse, 2010). In particular, 
expecting something to be absurd should play a significant role in determining our reaction to 
absurdity, as the threat experienced in these reactions is likely to be caused, at least partially, by 
                                                 
3
 Both Openness/Intellect and Need for Cognition are positively related to the Experience Seeking subscale of the 
Sensation Seeking Scale (Aluja et al., 2003; Sarmány, 1999), which has itself been shown to predict appreciation for 
nonsense humour (Ruch, 1988). As these two traits describe similar motivations and preferences as Experience 
Seeking, and as nonsense humour is highly-related to absurd humour, Openness and Need for Cognition should 
predict appreciation for absurd humour.  
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violations of expectation (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). If absurdity is expected, the shock of 
incongruity (and the resultant threat) should be reduced (Warren & McGraw, 2016). Having 
accurate expectations should also reduce the sense of unpredictability, which may also be a 
source of threat (Hirsh et al., 2012). Importantly, we typically expect absurd humour when we 
encounter it, such as when we intentionally watch absurd comedy in the form of a television 
show or film. If expectation can reduce threat to the point where this absurdity is perceived as 
benign, then absurdity should be more likely to be perceived as funny. Past work has shown that 
expectation can reduce the threat response to incongruity. In a study on meaning violations, 
Bruner and Postman (1949) presented participants with playing cards that had their colours 
reversed (e.g., hearts were black, spades were red, etc.), flashed on-screen for brief durations. 
Having been given no explicit expectations, participants relied on their past associations to 
inform their perception and interpretation of the stimuli (e.g., expecting hearts to be red). Thus, 
when presented with an incongruous card, their expectations and meaningful associations were 
violated. The authors reported that this meaning violation led participants to experience 
discomfort and confusion. However, the violation and its effects were contingent on the 
expectation of standard playing cards. If a participant expected an incongruous card (or once 
enough incongruous cards had been shown as to induce new expectations), the authors reported 
that these incongruous cards no longer produced discomfort and distress. So, expecting absurdity 
should act in a similar fashion, reducing threat and making it benign enough to be perceived as 
funny, according to the Benign Violation Theory of humour.  
Intention and Absurdity 
Another aspect of context that should affect perceptions of absurdity is knowledge of 
intention. Specifically, an intention to be funny may reduce threat and help to produce humour 
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for a few reasons. First, people who enjoy absurd humour know that it is intended to be funny. 
Second, humans generally operate under the assumption that information is intended to be both 
informative and sensible (Grice, 2002).Without knowledge of an intention to be funny, attempts 
at absurd humour may appear to be nothing but a flagrant violation of these norms, which will be 
perceived as threatening. Knowing that humour is intended may allow us to suspend these 
norms, reducing the threat experienced and rendering the incongruity sufficiently benign as to be 
found funny. There may also be other relevant norms at play when one believes that another 
intends to be funny. For example, it is impolite to laugh at someone if that person is not 
intending to be funny. Likewise, it is polite to laugh at someone intending to be funny (even if 
they might be failing at this). Additionally, because things that are meant to be funny are seen as 
inconsequential (“just a joke”), they should be perceived as less threatening, which may aid in 
perceiving absurdity as benign and therefore funny. Knowing that something is intended to be 
funny may also increase humour ratings by creating the expectation that the joke will be funny. 
Expecting a moderate
4
 level of humour has been found to increase humour ratings of traditional 
jokes compared to when a very high level of humour was expected or there were no expectations 
of the level of humour (Wimer & Beins, 2008). 
An expectation of humour and knowledge of humorous intentions should both encourage 
the perception of absurdity as funny. It is not entirely clear, however, how intention to be funny 
affects perceptions of absurdity in the presence or absence of an expectation of absurdity. In 
conjunction with an expectation of absurdity, perceived intention should function quite clearly to 
reduce threat and increase perceptions of humour. However, when no other expectations are 
                                                 
4
 Ratings of humour were lower when participants expected very high levels of humour. Although we make no 
specific predictions about how these different levels of expectation would operate in the context of absurd humour, 
it seems likely that a perceived intention to be funny would induce an expectation of moderate humour (as opposed 
to very high or very low). 
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explicitly provided, it may be that having information regarding an intention to be funny creates 
an expectation of traditional, non-absurd, humour. Most jokes follow a traditional format, with 
absurd humour occupying only a small niche of the humour landscape. If intention to be funny 
without the expectation of absurdity results in the expectation of a traditional joke, the shock of 
encountering absurdity may increase the threat rather than reduce it, thus rendering it malign and 
not funny. In this way, intention to be funny may interact with expectations of absurdity, 
encouraging the perception of absurdity as funny when absurd expectations are present and 
discouraging that perception when these expectations are absent. Without evidence that 
perceived intention to be funny induces this expectation of traditional humour though, this 
prediction of an interaction cannot be made with full confidence. Intention to be funny may 
unilaterally aid in reducing threat to a benign level, regardless of expectation of absurdity.  
Individual Differences, Expectation, and Intention 
A final possibility that should be discussed is the moderation of expectation and intention 
effects by individual differences. It may be that some individuals are high enough in tolerance to 
the threat of novelty (e.g., possessing high levels of traits like Openness, low levels of 
intolerance for rule violation like Conscientiousness, etc.) that they find almost all absurdity 
benign, regardless of context (i.e., intentions, expectations). For these individuals, the reduction 
of threat by expectations of absurdity may not increase the likelihood of finding absurdity funny. 
A similar moderation of intention to be funny is possible. First, the reduction in threat provided 
by knowledge of intention may be redundant for these individuals in a similar fashion to 
expectation. Second, although many of the humour-encouraging norms discussed above should 
still be relevant for individuals high in Openness (and related traits), those tolerant of rule 
violations may not be as motivated by these norms. A tolerance for rule violation likely extends 
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to a tolerance for norm-violation and so these individuals are more likely to violate norms. Thus, 
the effect of intention to be funny may be reduced in individuals who are low in Neuroticism and 
Conscientiousness.  
Though there has been little research on how factors like expectation and intention might 
influence perceptions of absurd humor, one study has indirectly examined this topic within the 
context of another research goal. Proulx, Heine, and Vohs (2010) presented participants with an 
absurd and humorous short story, manipulating the participants’ expectation of absurdity, in a 
study on meaning violations. Most surprisingly, no differences in ratings of humour were found 
based on expectation; those who expected the piece to be absurd found it just as funny as those 
who did not. There are, however, important aspects of the study that may undermine any possible 
conclusions about these results. Namely, the stimulus used did not employ absurd humour alone. 
Participants were presented with a Monty Python parody of a World War I fighter pilot story, 
which included drug use, homoerotic sexual innuendo, and slapstick, all of which are sources of 
humour distinct from absurdity. The effect of these humorous elements cannot be disentangled 
from those tied to the absurd elements in the story. Furthermore, expectation may not affect the 
perception of these more common forms of humour in the same way as it affects absurdity. As 
absurd humour has a distinctly-different structure from these other types of humour (Ruch, 
1992), expectation may even operate in a different manner entirely when these types of humour 
are presented together. Another potential concern with this study is the manipulation of 
expectation. First, expectation was confounded with intention to be funny. Participants in the 
expected absurdity condition read the following: “This story is an absurd parody of combat 
adventure stories and is meant to be a joke.” This manipulation gives not only an expectation of 
absurdity—the intended manipulation—but also explicates the intention behind the piece. In 
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contrast, participants in the control condition were given no explicit expectations or information 
about intentionality. Second, there are other differences between the two conditions that are not 
germane to the intended manipulation. For example, participants in the No Expectation condition 
were given historical information on World War I fighter pilots whereas the other condition did 
not receive this information. This information was intended to induce normal expectations (i.e., 
that the story would be a typical piece of historical fiction). However, this manipulation differs 
greatly from the expected absurdity condition, in which participants were explicitly told what to 
expect (an absurd parody) and were given no historical information.  
Current Study 
 The goal of this study is to examine how expectation of absurdity, perceived intention to 
be funny, and individual differences affect the perception of absurd humour. Participants were 
presented with pure examples of absurd stimuli and both their expectations and their knowledge 
of intention were individually manipulated. Furthermore, the conditions were closely matched by 
either including or omitting an explicit expectation induction and information about 
intentionality, allowing us to test the following hypotheses: 
H1: When absurdity is expected, absurd stimuli will be rated as funnier because the 
expectation will reduce threat, making the violation benign. 
H2: When an intention to be funny is perceived, absurd stimuli will be rated as funnier 
because intention reduces the threat, making the violation benign. 
H3: Perceived intention to be funny and expectation of absurdity will interact to affect 
funniness ratings, indicating that the effect of intention on perception of humour varies 
according to different levels of expectation. When absurdity is expected, intention to be 
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funny will lead to an increase in humour ratings (as predicted in H2). When absurdity is 
unexpected, perceived intention to be funny will lead to a decrease in humour ratings. This 
is due to the violation of an expectation of traditional humour created by knowledge of an 
intention to be funny. 
 As individual differences are also likely to influence whether absurdity is seen as 
humorous, this study included a battery of individual difference measures related to appreciating 
novelty and tolerating rule violations. These included the Big Five personality traits 
(Openness/Intellect, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism being of particular interest) (John & 
Srivastava, 1999), Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), Need for Closure (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994), and Intolerance for Uncertainty (Freeston et al., 1994). This allows us to test 
the following hypotheses: 
H4: Traits related to an appreciation of novelty will predict higher humour ratings of 
absurd stimuli. 
H5: Traits related to intolerance for rule violations, uncertainty, and ambiguity will predict 
lower humour ratings of absurd stimuli. 
H6: The effect of expectation on humour ratings of absurd stimuli will be reduced in 
individuals high in traits related to an appreciation of novelty and low in intolerance for 
rule violations. 
H7: The effect of intention to be funny on humour ratings of absurd stimuli will be reduced 
in individuals low in traits related to intolerance for rule violation.  
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Method 
 In order to avoid participant fatigue and possible order effects, the study was run in two 
separate phases completed at different times. Phase 1 consisted of the experimental portion of the 
study and participants were informed upon completion that they would be contacted within a few 
days to complete Phase 2, which consisted of the individual difference measures. Not all 
participants who completed Phase 1 also completed Phase 2, however.  
Participants 
Because the stimuli employ very nuanced and subtle language, they require a high degree 
of English fluency. In order to ensure appropriate comprehension, only participants with at least 
ten years of English fluency were recruited to participate in the study. There were 636 
participants recruited for the experimental phase of this study, all of whom were recruited from 
an undergraduate research pool and who received partial course credit for participation. Of the 
636 who were initially recruited, 418 (66%) participants completed both phases of the study.  
Data cleaning. All data cleaning was completed prior to the statistical analyses. Of the 
636 participants recruited for Phase 1, 5 (1%) did not consent to participate and were removed 
before analysis. Additional exclusions included 13 (2%) participants who failed our attention 
check item
5
 and 12 (2%) participants who reported that they did not respond honestly to the 
questionnaire. In order to ensure that only participants who had processed the manipulation were 
included in the analyses, 151 (24%) participants who were unable to accurately summarise the 
instructions given to them were also removed. Similarly, 36 (6%) participants were removed for 
incorrectly recalling the instructions in a multiple choice manipulation check. Finally, an attempt 
                                                 
5
 “Please select the sum of two plus three for this question.” Response was chosen from a drop down list. 
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was made to clean the data based on missing responses. However, all but 6 participants 
responded to every question. The remaining 6 missed only 1 question and so no participants were 
removed based on missing responses. The final sample therefore consisted of 432 participants 
(306 women, 2 unreported).  
 Of the 418 participants who initially completed Phase 2, 3 (1%) did not consent to 
participate and were excluded. A further 101 (24%) participants were removed for failing one or 
more attention check items
6
, and 4 participants were removed for providing missing data for 
more than 5% of the measures of interest. All exclusions were made prior to any data analysis. 
The final sample that completed Phase 2 of the study consisted of 310 participants. After this 
data cleaning was completed, 222 participants remained who had successfully completed both 
phases of the study. 
Stimuli 
By way of absurd stimuli, 10 jokes were taken from the Internet community known as 
Weird Twitter. These jokes were chosen as targets because they eschew traditional elements of 
humour in favour of a uniquely absurd style. Importantly, we have selected stimuli that are 
purely absurd—that is, irrational, illogical, or strange—and do not contain other humorous 
elements, allowing us to be more confident that any effects observed are attributable to absurdity 
per se, rather than some other element of humour. Participants were presented with three 
different jokes, presented in an order randomly chosen from ten different orders, allowing us to 
monitor and control order effects. Only three targets were presented because we assumed that 
new expectations would form after continued exposure to absurd targets. In light of this 
                                                 
6
 E.g., “Please click on very characteristic of me and proceed to the next question.” 
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possibility, we also analysed only the first presentation of a target in order to examine whether 
induced expectations were wiped out after first encounter with an absurd text. Using a diverse set 
of 10 possible targets (with subsets of 3 shown to each participant) shown allows us to be more 
confident in the generalisability of any effects observed to absurd jokes as a whole. All targets 
are provided in Appendix A. 
Target Ratings 
 Participants were asked to provide four ratings for each target, with each rating made on a 
7-point scale. The first rating served as the main dependent variable: “How funny was the 
passage you just read?” (1 = “not at all funny,” 7 = “very funny”). Second, participants rated how 
familiar they found the text to be: “How familiar are you with this passage (or a close variation 
of it)?” (1 = “not at all familiar,” 7 = “very familiar”). In previous studies conducted in our lab, 
familiarity has been found to be an important predictor of humour ratings. Third, participants 
made a rating intended to obscure the true intentions of the study: “How grammatical was the 
passage you just read?” (1 = “not at all grammatical,” 7 = “very grammatical”). Finally, as a 
means of measuring appreciation that may not be captured by the funniness rating, participants 
were asked how likely they would be to share the text with friends: “How likely would you be to 
share this with your friends?” (1 = “not at all likely,” 7 = “very likely”). 
Individual Difference Measures 
 The Big Five. The Big Five personality traits were measured using the Big Five Aspect 
Scale (BFAS; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). The BFAS was used because it allows us to 
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measure both the Big Five personality traits and the two aspects that compose each of the traits.
7
 
The BFAS consists of 100 short descriptive phrases, each of which is associated with one of the 
ten aspects (e.g., “I get easily agitated” for Volatility; “I laugh a lot” for Enthusiasm). 
Participants were asked to rate each phrase on how well it described them on a 5-point Likert 
scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). The measure has been shown to have 
good psychometric properties, with aspect-specific alpha reliability coefficients ranging between 
.72 and .89 (DeYoung et al., 2007). 
 Intolerance of Uncertainty. Intolerance of Uncertainty was measured using the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & Dugas, 2002). The scale consists of 27 phrases 
describing feelings towards uncertainty (e.g., “The ambiguities in life stress me”). Participants 
were asked to rate each phrase on how characteristic of them it was on a 5-point Likert scale 
from 1 (“not at all characteristic of me”) to 5 (“entirely characteristic of me”). The measure has 
been shown to have good psychometric properties, with an alpha reliability coefficient of .91 
(Buhr & Dugas, 2002) and a test-retest reliability over a five-week period of r = .78 (Dugas, 
Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997). 
 Ambiguity Tolerance. Participants also completed a short measure of Ambiguity 
Tolerance. Specifically, they completed the Art Forms subscale of the Measure of Ambiguity 
Tolerance (Norton, 1975). This subscale consists of 8 statements that specifically deal with 
tolerance for ambiguity within media (e.g., “A poem should never contain contradictions”). 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement with each item on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
(“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). It’s worth noting that although the scale is named 
                                                 
7
 The two aspects that compose each of the Big Five personality traits are as follows: Openness to Experience and 
Intellect for Openness/Intellect; Orderliness and Industriousness for Conscientiousness; Enthusiasm and 
Assertiveness for Extraversion; Politeness and Compassion for Agreeableness; and Withdrawal and Volatility for 
Neuroticism (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). 
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“Ambiguity Tolerance,” higher values actually indicate lower tolerance for ambiguity. The full 
Ambiguity Tolerance measure has been shown to have good psychometric properties, with an 
internal consistency of r = .88 and test-retest reliability of r = .86 over a 10-to-12 week period 
(Norton, 1975).  
 Need for Closure. Need for Closure was measured using a short-form version of the 
original 42 item scale, consisting of 15 items (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). The scale consists of 15 statements (e.g., “I don’t like situations that are uncertain”) and 
participants are asked to rate how much they agree with each item on a 6-point Likert scale from 
1 (“strongly disagree”) to 6 (“strongly agree”). The measure has been shown to have good 
psychometric properties, with an alpha reliability coefficient of .87 and a test-retest reliability 
over a four-week period of r = 0.79 (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). 
 Need for Cognition. Need for Cognition was measured using the Need for Cognition 
Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), which consists of 18 statements (e.g., “I prefer my life to 
be filled with puzzles I must solve”). Participants were asked to indicate to what degree each 
statement is characteristic of them on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (“extremely uncharacteristic 
of me”) to 5 (“extremely characteristic of me”). The measure has been shown to have good 
psychometric properties, with an alpha reliability coefficient of .90 (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 
1984).  
Procedure 
Data were collected using the online survey client Qualtrics (www.Qualtrics.com) for 
both phases of the study. Once recruited, participants were provided with a link to the survey and 
were able to complete it at their leisure. At the end of the Phase 1, participants were told that 
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they would be contacted in a few days to complete a second related study that would also be 
worth partial course credit.  
The two manipulations used in this study were (1) inducing the expectation of 
encountering absurd stimuli, and (2) informing participants that the stimuli were intended to be 
funny. In order to control differences between conditions as much as possible, these two 
manipulations were executed by either including or omitting the relevant information in the 
instructions presented. This resulted in a 2 (Expectation) x 2 (Intention) design. 
Due to concerns that our manipulation would not be fully processed by students who are 
used to participating in online survey studies and seeing very similar sets of instructions, we took 
a number of precautions to encourage participants to pay close attention to the instructions 
provided (in which the manipulation was embedded). After consenting to take part in the study, 
participants were asked to “Please be sure to read the instructions closely and carefully as this is 
not a traditional task.” Participants were then randomly assigned to receive one of four sets of 
instructions: 
(1) “Please read the following passages and respond to the questions that follow.” 
(Control) (No expectation of absurdity/No knowledge of intention) 
(2) “Please read the following passages and respond to the questions that follow. The 
passages you are about to read are absurd (i.e., strange, illogical).” (Absurd Condition) 
(Expectation of absurdity/No knowledge of intention) 
(3) “Please read the following passages and respond to the questions that follow. The 
passages you are about to read were written to be funny (i.e., humorous, make people 
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laugh).” (Funny Condition) (No expectation of absurdity/Knowledge of intention to be 
funny) 
(4) “Please read the following passages and respond to the questions that follow. The 
passages you are about to read are absurd (i.e., strange, illogical) and were written to be 
funny (i.e., humorous, make people laugh).” (Absurd/Funny Condition) (Expectation of 
absurdity/Knowledge of intention to be funny) 
On the same page as the provided instructions, participants were asked to summarise the 
instructions in their own words. This was intended to encourage participants to fully process the 
manipulation and served as a basis for removing participants who could not show that they 
attended to the instructions. The instructions were provided as an image in order to prevent copy 
and pasting of text. Participants who did not accurately summarise the manipulation present in 
the instructions (i.e., information about expectations or intentionality) were removed prior to all 
analyses. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of 10 possible stimulus orders. In 
order to further encourage participants to attend to the manipulation, the instructions were 
provided at the top of the page for each stimulus presentation. Each stimulus was presented on its 
own page along with the four questions detailed in the Ratings section. 
 After completing presentation of the third stimulus, participants were asked what we had 
told them about the passages in the instructions, with multiple choice responses. The possible 
answers were (1) Nothing (Control), (2) That the passages would be absurd (Absurd Condition), 
(3) That the passages would be funny (Funny Condition), (4) That the passages would be absurd 
and funny (Absurd/Funny Condition), and (5) Don’t know/don’t remember. This question was 
intended to serve as a manipulation check, allowing us to remove participants who did not 
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process the manipulation adequately enough to recognise it from a list some moments later. 
Participants who did not select the answer corresponding to their condition
8
 were removed prior 
to all analyses. Participants then completed a demographics questionnaire and were debriefed. 
Participants who completed Phase 1 were contacted by email between 3 and 7 days later 
to complete Phase 2. This delay should have removed any possibility for the manipulation in 
Phase 1 to affect the responses collected in Phase 2. After consenting to participate, participants 
in Phase 2 completed the 5 individual difference measures in a randomised order. Embedded 
within the measures were 3 items designed to identify inattentive responders. Participants who 
responded incorrectly to one or more of these items were removed prior to any analyses. 
Participants were subsequently debriefed.   
  
                                                 
8
 “Don’t know/don’t remember” was also accepted as a correct response for participants in the Control condition, as 
this response does not indicate any lack of processing on their part. 
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Results 
Due to concerns that the effect of our manipulations would be reduced by the new 
expectations formed upon encountering the first stimulus, we planned to conduct all analyses 
twice: once using the mean of the 3 funniness ratings as a dependent variable and again using 
just the first funniness rating made. Although we anticipated results to differ between the two 
sets of analyses, most ended up being quite similar. As a result, notable differences between the 
two sets of analyses will be noted in the text and less pertinent results will be footnoted. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The final sample consisted of 132 participants in the Control condition, 108 participants 
in the Absurd condition, 116 participants in the Funny condition, and 76 participants in the 
Absurd/Funny condition. That there are the most participants remaining in the Control condition 
and the fewest remaining in the Absurd/Funny condition is not surprising, as the prior’s 
manipulation check was the easiest to pass and the latter’s was the  most difficult.9 Descriptive 
statistics of the four ratings made by participants are reported across and by condition in Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics for the individual difference measures are available in Table 2. 
The overall mean funniness rating of the Tweets was relatively low, below the mid-point 
of the 7-point scale (Macross conditions = 2.57, SDacross conditions = 1.24). Each condition’s mean 
funniness rating was also low, with all means below the scale’s mid-point (MControl = 2.49, 
SDControl = 1.25; MAbsurd = 2.60, SDAbsurd = 1.16; MFunny = 2.46, SDFunny = 1.31; MAbsurd/Funny = 
                                                 
9
 Both “Nothing” and “Don’t know/don’t remember” were acceptable answers for the Control condition, so passing 
the manipulation check required only that you not incorrectly recall instructions (as opposed to correctly recalling 
specific instructions). Passing the Absurd/Funny manipulation check, on the other hand, required participants to 
correctly recall two pieces of information from the instructions, making it more difficult than any other manipulation 
check.  
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2.83, SDAbsurd/Funny = 1.19), indicating that participants generally did not find the stimuli all that 
funny, regardless of condition. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for ratings by condition 
Measure Mean SD Min. Max. 
Funniness (2.57) (1.24) (1) (7) 
          Control 2.49 1.25 1 6.67 
          Absurd 2.6 1.16 1 6 
          Funny 2.46 1.31 1 7 
          Absurd/Funny 
 
2.83 1.19 1 5.33 
Familiar (1.37) (0.6) (1) (4.33) 
          Control 1.38 0.58 1 3.67 
          Absurd 1.28 0.47 1 3.67 
          Funny 1.43 0.69 1 4.33 
          Absurd/Funny 
 
1.43 0.68 1 3.67 
Grammatical (4.21) (1.25) (1) (7) 
          Control 4.2 1.27 1 7 
          Absurd 4.15 1.21 1.67 7 
          Funny 4.18 1.29 1 7 
          Absurd/Funny 
 
4.35 1.22 1.33 6.67 
Sharing (1.93) (1.13) (1) (7) 
          Control 1.9 1.17 1 6.33 
          Absurd 1.94 1.02 1 5 
          Funny 1.84 1.16 1 7 
          Absurd/Funny 2.11 1.14 1 5.67 
Note. Across-condition statistics presented in parentheses. N = 432. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for individual difference measures 
Measure Mean SD Min. Max. Cronbach’s α 
Openness/Intellect 3.48 0.45 2.25 4.8 .79 
Conscientiousness 3.28 0.47 1.65 4.55 .82 
Extraversion 3.38 0.49 1.95 4.6 .85 
Agreeableness 3.8 0.4 2.6 4.9 .79 
Neuroticism 3.11 0.63 1.55 4.75 .90 
Intellect 3.36 0.57 1.6 4.8 .77 
Openness to Experience 3.59 0.53 2 5 .71 
Orderliness 3.51 0.57 1.3 4.9 .78 
Industriousness 3.04 0.58 1.3 4.7 .79 
Enthusiasm 3.5 0.56 1.8 5 .79 
Assertiveness 3.27 0.59 1.4 4.9 .81 
Politeness 3.63 0.49 2.2 4.9 .65 
Compassion 3.97 0.49 2.4 5 .81 
Withdrawal 3.18 0.64 1.6 5 .81 
Volatility 3.04 0.76 1.3 5 .88 
Need for Cognition 3.15 0.47 1.5 4.5 .73 
Art Forms Subscale 
(Ambiguity Tolerance) 
3.87 0.62 2 5.88 .33 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 2.61 0.81 1 4.85 .95 
Need for Closure 4.05 0.69 2.13 6 .83 
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Table 3 
Condition differences in mean funniness rating 
 Control Expected Intended Expected/Intended 
Control – -0.11 (-.09) 0.03 (.02) -0.34 (-.28) 
Expected – – 0.14 (.11) -0.23 (-.20) 
Intended – – – -0.37 (-.30) 
Expected/Intended – – – – 
Note. Cohen’s D presented in parentheses. N = 432. 
Table 4 
Condition differences in mean funniness rating (first rating only) 
 Control Expected Intended Expected/Intended 
Control – -0.18 (-.11) 0.08 (.05) -0.44 (-.29) 
Expected – – 0.26 (.16) -0.26 (-.16) 
Intended – – – -0.52 (-.34) 
Expected/Intended – – – – 
Note. Cohen’s D presented in parentheses. N = 432. 
Analysis of Variance 
Mean differences were mainly small and are presented in Table 3. Although they are 
small, all differences were in the hypothesised directions. Namely, the Funny condition’s mean 
funniness rating is lowest, as we anticipated. Participants in this condition likely expected a 
traditionally-funny stimulus and were instead presented with something bizarre and confusing, 
which would have increased the level of threat experienced beyond a benign level. In contrast, 
the Absurd/Funny condition had the highest mean funniness ratings, again as we predicted. The 
information given in the instructions to these participants regarding expectation and intention is 
hypothesized to have helped lower the level of threat experienced to a point where it was benign 
and therefore funny. The Absurd condition had the second highest mean funniness rating. We 
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anticipated this result as expectation of absurdity should have helped to lower threat (compared 
to the Control condition), but not as effectively as the information regarding expectation and 
intention in the Absurd/Funny condition.
10
 
A 2 (Expectation) x 2 (Intention) Factorial ANOVA was conducted to assess the effects 
of expectation of absurdity, perceived intention to be funny, and their interaction on mean 
funniness ratings of the absurd jokes. No significant effects were found. The main effect of 
Expectation neared the traditional threshold for statistical significance, but the magnitude of the 
effect was small (FExpectation(1, 428) = 3.40, p = .066, η
2
 = .008). Both the main effect of Intention 
and the interaction term were statistically non-significant and small in magnitude (FIntention(1, 
428) = 0.439, p = .51, η2 = .001; FE*I(1, 428) = 1.22, p = .27, η
2
 = .003). Although mean 
funniness ratings differed between conditions in the predicted ways, these differences did not 
achieve statistical significance.  
An identical 2 (Expectation) x 2 (Intention) Factorial ANOVA was run on the first 
funniness rating made by participants to examine whether a different pattern of results would be 
observed when no additional expectation was formed as a result of repeated exposure to the 
absurd jokes. In this analysis, the main effect of Expectation was statistically significant but 
small in magnitude (FExpectation(1, 428) = 4.45, p = .034, η
2
 = .01). The fact that this effect 
emerges when examining only the first stimulus presented but not after averaging across the 
three stimuli suggests that the effect of the Expectation manipulation was reduced in the latter 
two stimulus presentations, likely due to new expectations forming after presentation of the first 
joke. It would seem that whether we tell participants that the stimuli are absurd or not, once they 
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 Mean funniness ratings, both overall and by-condition, were quite similar in the first rating made as in the mean of 
all 3 ratings. Condition mean differences were also quite similar, both in terms of magnitude and direction. 
Condition mean differences for the first rating only are presented in Table 4. 
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see the first absurd stimulus they expect later stimuli to also be absurd. Both the Intention main 
effect and the interaction term remained statistically non-significant and small (FIntention(1, 428) = 
0.154, p = .70, η2 = .0004; FE*I(1, 428) = 1.19, p = .28, η
2
 = .003). Condition means again 
differed in the predicted directions but Expectation was the only effect to achieve statistical 
significance. 
Regressions 
Regression models were used to investigate both the relationship between each individual 
difference variable and humour ratings for the absurd jokes, as well as any potential moderation 
of the Expectation and Intention effects. Specifically, we were interested in the possible 
moderation of Expectation by traits related to an appreciation of novelty (i.e., aspect Openness, 
Need for Cognition) and a tolerance for rule violations (i.e., Conscientiousness). We were also 
interested in the possible moderation of Intention effects by traits related to intolerance for rule 
violations. In addition to these specific models, all other possible moderation effects involving an 
individual difference were investigated. Each model regressed ratings of humour
11
 on 
Expectation and Intention as dummy-coded predictors, with an individual difference measure 
and all possible two-way interaction terms included in the model. Because these regressions 
required that participants complete both Phase 1 and Phase 2, the total sample size for these 
analyses was 222. All results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
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 All regression models were carried out using both the mean funniness rating and the first funniness rating. 
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Table 5 
Regressions showing prediction of mean funniness rating using Expectation, Intention, and individual differences  
Measure Expectation (B) Intention (B) ID (B) E*I (B) E*ID (B) I*ID (B) 
Openness/Intellect 2.86 
(-4.46, 2.11) 
-2.29 
(-5.46, 1.37) 
-0.10 
(-0.89, 0.83) 
0.79 
(0.036, 1.55)* 
0.39 
(-0.60, 1.24) 
0.59 
(-0.43, 1.48) 
Conscientiousness -0.85 
(-4.89, 2.88) 
-0.60 
(-4.10, 2.94) 
-0.40 
(-1.54, 0.72) 
0.68 
(-0.11, 1.47) 
0.25 
(-0.86, 1.46) 
0.16 
(-0.88, 1.88) 
Extraversion 1.28 
(-1.94, 4.47) 
0.23 
(-2.78, 3.41) 
0.52 
(-0.20, 1.31) 
0.78 
(-0.086, 1.56) 
-0.38 
(-1.29, 0.55) 
-0.13 
(-1.01, 0.71) 
Agreeableness 2.19 
(-1.05, 5.88) 
1.07 
(-2.49, 4.78) 
0.48 
(-0.22, 1.28) 
0.76 
(-0.78, 1.54) 
-0.59 
(-1.53, 0.25) 
-0.33 
(-1.26, 0.57) 
Neuroticism 1.50 
(-1.11, 4.59) 
1.49 
(-3.08, 2.40) 
0.70 
(-0.42, 1.59) 
0.69 
(0.25, 2.17)* 
-0.49 
(-1.52, 0.35) 
-0.52 
(-0.91, 0.94) 
Need for Cognition -0.73 
(-3.71, 2.22) 
-1.09 
(-3.96, 2.02) 
0.14 
(-0.69, 1.03) 
0.75 
(-0.50, 1.58) 
0.22 
(-0.72, 1.16) 
0.29 
(-0.69, 1.19) 
Ambiguity Tolerance 1.08 
(-1.55, 3.62) 
4.40 
(1.83, 7.07)* 
0.88 
(0.19, 1.54)* 
0.83 
(0.04, 1.60)* 
-0.29 
(-0.96, 0.41) 
-1.19 
(-1.90, -0.51)* 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 0.58 
(-0.23, 2.62) 
0.17 
(-1.06, 2.07) 
0.53 
(-0.047, 1.13) 
0.76 
(.010, 1.59)* 
-0.26 
(-0.85, 0.35) 
-0.13 
(-0.70, 0.45) 
Need for Closure 1.22 
(-2.33, 3.55) 
1.17 
(-2.13, 4.09) 
0.57 
(-2.25, 3.79) 
0.82 
(-0.26, 1.24) 
-0.33 
(-1.04, 0.50) 
-0.35 
(-1.01, 0.50) 
Note. Values are 95% confidence intervals. * = CIs not including 0. E*I = Expectation-Intention interaction term. ID = Listed 
individual difference measure. E*ID = Expectation-individual difference interaction term. I*ID = Intention-individual difference 
interaction term. N = 222. 
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Table 6 
Regressions showing prediction of first funniness rating using Expectation, Intention, and individual difference 
Measure Expectation (B) Intention (B) ID (B) E*I (B) E*ID (B) I*ID (B) 
Openness/Intellect -1.68 
(-5.28, 2.73) 
-1.52 
(-5.21, 2.98) 
0.04 
(-0.83, 1.11) 
1.25 
(0.26, 2.17)* 
0.46 
(-0.78, 1.46) 
0.34 
(-0.91, 1.35) 
Conscientiousness -1.74  
(-7.04, 3.64) 
-4.26  
(-9.53, 1.21) 
-0.79  
(-2.24, 0.76) 
1.27 
(0.25, 2.28)* 
0.52 
(-1.12, 2.14) 
1.19 
(-0.40, 2.72) 
Extraversion 0.35 
(-4.26, 4.95) 
-2.35 
(-6.77, 2.36) 
0.06 
(-0.90, 1.07) 
1.39 
(0.33, 2.14)* 
-0.12 
(-1.46, 1.24) 
0.57 
(-0.74, 1.80) 
Agreeableness 0.89 
(-2.82, 5.28) 
2.38 
(-1.69, 7.03) 
0.58 
(-0.16, 1.43) 
1.19 
(0.15, 2.17)* 
-0.24 
(-1.36, 0.69) 
-0.70 
(-1.87, 0.34) 
Neuroticism 1.67 
(-1.11, 4.59) 
-0.29 
(-3.08, 2.40) 
0.54 
(-0.42, 1.59) 
1.16 
(-0.25, 2.17) 
-0.55 
(-1.52, 0.35) 
0.01 
(-0.91, 0.94) 
Need for Cognition -0.48 
(-4.51, 3.33) 
-2.06 
(-6.33, 2.38) 
-0.06 
(-1.11, 0.95) 
1.22 
(0.20, 2.19)* 
0.13 
(-1.06, 1.40) 
0.55 
(-0.82, 1.87) 
Ambiguity Tolerance 0.13 
(-3.55, 3.55) 
0.81 
(-2.31, 4.13) 
0.42 
(-0.43, 1.21) 
1.19 
(0.020, 2.17)* 
-0.05 
(-0.96, 0.92) 
-0.29 
(-1.16, 0.53) 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 2.16 
(0.30, 4.26)* 
-0.85 
(-2.53, 0.84) 
0.90 
(0.27, 1.67)* 
1.15 
(.20, 2.18)* 
-0.88 
(-1.68, -0.20) 
0.23 
(-0.47, 0.92) 
Need for Closure 1.84 
(-2.00, 5.39) 
0.02 
(-4.01, 3.33) 
0.57 
(-0.37, 1.39) 
1.31 
(0.35, 2.34)* 
-0.48 
(-1.38, 0.49) 
-0.10 
(-0.97, 0.93) 
Note. Values are 95% confidence intervals. * = CIs not including 0. E*I = Expectation-Intention interaction term. ID = Listed 
individual difference measure. E*ID = Expectation-individual difference interaction term. I*ID = Intention-individual difference 
interaction term. N = 222.  
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Each regression was bootstrapped with 1,999 bootstrap resamples and 95% confidence 
intervals were calculated. There was no evidence for any of the predicted relationships with 
individual differences, nor any evidence for the predicted moderation effects. One result that did 
emerge in many models
12
 was that the Expectation-Intention interaction term was small and 
statistically significant after introducing and controlling for the various individual difference 
measures (e.g., 95% CI of 0.036, 1.55, when trait Openness was included as a predictor). As 
shown in Figures 1 and 2, perceived intention to be funny led to higher ratings of humour when 
absurdity was expected but lower ratings of humour when absurdity was not expected, after 
controlling for one of a variety of individual differences. This suggests that the effect of Intention 
differs in the presence or absence of Expectation, after controlling for a variety of individual 
differences. This interaction was explored further by examining the simple effect of Intention at 
the two levels of Expectation. The sample was split into two based on whether absurdity was 
expected (NExpected = 184, NUnexpected = 248). Regressions were then run separately for these two 
groups. These regressions included as predictors Intention, an individual difference, and the 
interaction between the two. These simple effects, however, differed considerably based on 
which individual difference was included in the model. For example, when Openness is included 
in the model and absurdity is expected, Intention is not a statistically significant predictor of 
either first funniness ratings or mean funniness ratings. However, when absurdity is not 
expected, Intention becomes a statistically significant negative predictor of both first funniness 
ratings (B = -4.49, p = .047) and mean funniness ratings (B = -3.47, p = .038), as was predicted. 
In contrast, when Intolerance for Uncertainty is included in the model, the effect of Intention is 
not statistically significant when absurdity is expected (First: B = -.85, p = .46; Mean: B = -.13, p 
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 The Expectation-Intention interaction term was significant in all models based on the first funniness rating. For 
models regressed on the mean funniness rating, it was significant for the models including trait Openness, Need for 
Closure, Intolerance for Uncertainty, and the measure of Ambiguity Tolerance (Art Forms). 
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= .89) but positive and statistically significant when absurdity is not expected (First: B = 2.10, p 
= .04; Mean: B = 1.84, p = .02). This relationship is in the opposite direction from what was 
predicted. The same relationship was also found when Need for Closure was included as a 
predictor and absurdity was not expected (First: B = 4.61, p = .008; Mean: B = 3.94, p = .002). In 
other models, Intention was not a statistically significant predictor of funniness, regardless of 
whether absurdity was expected. In these cases, the effect of Intention is changing based on level 
of Expectation, but it is not having a statistically significant effect on rating of funniness in either 
instance.  
Intolerance for Uncertainty was also found to positively predict first funniness ratings 
(95% CI: 0.010, 1.59), which is unexpected as higher levels of Intolerance for Uncertainty 
should lead to less positive perceptions of absurd humour. The Intolerance for Uncertainty-
Expectation interaction term was also significant when predicting first funniness ratings (95% 
CI: -1.68, -0.20), indicating that the effect of Expectation is lower at high levels of Intolerance 
for Uncertainty. This is also unexpected, as Expectation was predicted to be more important in 
determining levels of threat for people who are less tolerant of uncertainty. Finally, when the Art 
Form subscale of the Ambiguity Tolerance scale was included in a model predicting mean 
funniness rating, a number of positive findings emerged. First, the effect of Intention became 
positive and significant (95% CI: 1.83, 7.07). Second, Ambiguity Tolerance became a small but 
significant positive predictor (95% CI: 0.19, 1.54). Again, this is surprising as higher values of 
Ambiguity Tolerance
13
 should lead to lower perceived humour for absurd jokes. Finally, the 
Intention-Ambiguity Tolerance interaction term also emerged as a significant negative predictor 
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 Ambiguity Tolerance is coded such that higher values indicate higher levels of intolerance for ambiguity. 
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(95% CIs: -1.90, -0.51), indicating that knowing absurdity is intended to be funny leads to 
greater perceptions of humour for individuals who are less perturbed by ambiguity.  
Correlations 
In an exploratory analysis collapsing across conditions, relationships amongst the four 
ratings made by participants were examined. Due to the non-normal distribution of some of these 
ratings, Spearman’s rho was employed. All correlations are reported in Table 7. One notable 
result is that ratings of funniness and familiarity were found to be significantly positively related 
(  = .27, p < .01), which is line with previous findings on the relationship between humour and 
familiarity. This relationship also suggests that familiarity may play a role in reducing the threat 
of absurd stimuli, though this would have to be explored experimentally to say for certain. 
Likelihood of sharing and familiarity also had a significant positive relationship, providing 
further evidence for the role that familiarity plays in the appreciation of humour (  = .63, p < 
.01).  
Table 7 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients amongst ratings 
 Funniness Familiarity Grammatical Sharing 
Funniness – 0.27** 0.084 0.63** 
Familiarity – – -.024 0.35** 
Grammatical – – – 0.12* 
Sharing – – – – 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01. N = 432.  
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Exploratory Analyses 
  Although we had planned analyses and predictions for these data, there were a number of 
interesting aspects of this study for which we had no strong predictions and which fell outside 
the primary goals of this study.  
Sample Size. An issue that may have affected all of our analyses is sample size. 
Although our initial sample was large, many participants were removed due to failing the first 
manipulation check (n = 151, 24%). These exclusions reflect the difficulties of having people 
attend to subtle text-based manipulations. That said, other explanations for this large number of 
exclusions could exist. After viewing the results, we became concerned that we may have failed 
to anticipate a possible misinterpretation of our manipulation check that led to people being 
excluded inappropriately. Our manipulation check required participants to summarise the 
instructions provided to them, but not all of the information we required to be mentioned were 
technically part of the instructions. The information regarding the key manipulations (e.g., “The 
passages you are about to read are absurd [i.e., strange, illogical]”) could be considered examples 
rather than an instruction per se. Participants who interpreted our request this way may have 
summarised the instructions as something like “read the passages and answer the questions” 
(which was a very common response). In this case, these participants may have fully processed 
the manipulation but mistakenly not included it in their response due to misinterpreting the 
question. However, the same response could also be made by a participant who did not read the 
instructions but is familiar with typical survey studies. Thus, it’s possible that we are unable to 
separate participants who did not process the manipulation from those who did (but did not show 
it). This potential error in data cleaning may have led to an unnecessarily large reduction in our 
final sample size.  
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Because many of the effects in which we are interested appear to be small in magnitude, 
we may not have had sufficient power in our final samples to detect them. This would explain 
why, for example, we see mean differences in the predicted directions between our four 
conditions but detect few significant differences in the ANOVA. In order to address these 
concerns about power and our manipulation check, we decided to repeat our main analyses using 
a sample that included the participants who were originally removed due to the first manipulation 
check. This sample included 619 participants, 80 of whom were then removed for failing the 
second portion of the manipulation check: recognising the manipulation we gave them in a 
multiple choice question. One participant was then removed for having missed more than 1 of 
the primary ratings, resulting in a final sample of 559. After repeating our analyses with this 
larger sample, and increased statistical power, our results generally did not change. Neither 
Expectation, nor Intention, or their interaction was statistically significant in the ANOVA, based 
on either mean funniness ratings (ps = .14, .94, .23, respectively) or first funniness ratings (ps = 
.22, .80, .29, respectively). One change we did observe is that the effect of Expectation on first 
funniness ratings, which was statistically significant in the original ANOVA on first funniness 
ratings, became statistically non-significant. When taking into account the individual differences 
data, we found that the total number of these 559 participants who completed both phases was 
287, so including these participants does not increase power substantially from the results 
reported above. That said, when repeating these analyses we observed generally the same results, 
with no new relationships between individual differences and funniness ratings of absurd jokes. 
Although including these participants did increase statistical power, the difficulties with 
our manipulation check remain: we cannot know for certain whether participants removed for 
incorrectly responding to our manipulation check did not read the instructions or genuinely 
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misinterpreted our request. Properly addressing both the issue of power and ambiguity in our 
manipulation check would require that the study be replicated with a greater sample size and a 
more discernibly-attentive sample. To achieve this, a better means of checking the success rate of 
our subtle manipulations is necessary. Alternatively, the impact of the manipulations could be 
increased. 
Culture. How one’s culture relates to the perception of absurdity is a question that we 
have regularly been asked since beginning this line of research. Appreciation for a type of 
humour related to absurd humour, nonsense humour, has been shown to differ between cultures 
(Ruch & Forabosco, 1996). Culture is likely an important determinant of one’s perception of 
absurdity for a number of reasons. First, the prevalence of absurdity in humour likely differs 
between cultures. Japanese humour, for example, uses absurdity very commonly, even in the 
mainstream, whereas absurd humour is at least somewhat more niche in North America. Second, 
the contradictions and logical gaps that are so common in absurd humour are likely also to be 
perceived differently between cultures, due to differences in cognitive processing. East Asians, 
for example, tend to be more dialectical in their thinking: they are able to assimilate multiple 
perspectives, tolerating some contradictions, in order to find a “middle way” (Peng & Nisbett, 
1999; Nisbett et al., 2001). Westerners, in contrast, are more rigid in their thinking, preferring to 
adhere more strictly to categories, rules, and formal logic (Nisbett et al., 2001). Because absurd 
humour regularly violates logic, Westerners should find it more violating than do East Asians. 
Thus, Westerners should require a greater reduction in threat in order to find absurd humour 
funny, whereas East Asians should be more predisposed to appreciating it.  
We asked participants to report the culture with which they most identify. Our final 
sample consisted of 117 North Americans, 117 South Asians, 32 Middle Eastern individuals, 30 
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Southeast Asians, 26 East Asians, and a small number in several other categories. The full 
breakdown is provided in Table 8. Because we did not have enough East Asians to directly 
compare to Westerners, we instead opted to form two cultural groups: one consisting of North 
Americans and Western Europeans and another consisting of everyone else. This is, admittedly, 
a very crude comparison. But by comparing these two groups, we can determine if Westerners 
perceive the absurd jokes differently from non-Westerners in general. The Western group 
consisted of 122 participants and their mean first funniness rating was 2.84, whereas the other 
group consisted of 302 participants and their mean first funniness rating was 2.36. A 2 
(Expectation) x 2 (Intention) x 2 (Cultural group) ANOVA was run to determine the relative 
effect of culture on funniness ratings of absurd jokes. When first funniness rating was used as the 
dependent variable, the main effect of Expectation was small but significant (FExpectation = 5.11, p 
= .02, η2 = .0083), as was the main effect of Culture (FCulture = 6.81, p = .009, η
2
 = .015). No 
other main effects or interaction terms were statistically significant (all ps > .08). Surprisingly, 
after controlling for Expectation and Intention, Westerners rated the first absurd target as slightly 
funnier than did the non-Westerners. This is counter to our expectations, although the non-
Westerner group is composed of many different cultures, not all of which are necessarily more 
tolerant of absurdity than Westerners. It may therefore be that this observed difference is the 
product of broader cultural differences in humour. Although these jokes are absurd, they were 
written by Westerners for a Western audience; non-Westerners may generally find them less 
appealing than do Westerners.
14
 These results also show that Expectation still has a significant 
effect on perceived humour, even after controlling for cultural status. Furthermore, as the Culture 
interaction terms were non-significant, there is no indication that Expectation and Intention 
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The interpretation of these mean differences is further complicated by the difference in response biases between 
cultures. For example, responses from East Asians tend to be more moderate and ambivalent than those Westerners 
due to dialectical thinking (Hamamura, Heine, & Paulhus, 2008).   
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operate differently in these two groups. Again, this is somewhat surprising, as we would expect 
Expectation to be more influential for a group that is less predisposed towards absurdity, 
although this may again be difficult to interpret given the heterogeneous composition of our non-
Westerner group. Finally, the same 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA using mean funniness rating for all three 
jokes as the dependent variable found only one significant main effect: that of Expectation 
(FExpectation = 4.09, p = .044, η
2
 = .0083). No interaction terms were significant. This suggests that 
the cultural difference in funniness ratings is mainly present in the perception of the first target; 
cultural differences may wash away once the initial meaning violation has taken place. 
Table 8 
Culture Frequency 
African 13 
Caribbean 23 
Don’t Know 1 
East Asian 26 
Eastern European 13 
Mediterranean 26 
Middle Eastern 32 
North American 117 
None 5 
Other 8 
South American 11 
South Asian 117 
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Southeast Asian 30 
Western European 5 
Note. Five participants declined to answer. 
A 2 (Expectation) x 2 (Intention) ANOVA was then run for both groups separately and 
somewhat different results from those above were found. Namely, the effect of Expectation on 
mean funniness rating was significant for Westerners (FExpectation = 4.43, p = .037, η
2
 = .0036) but 
not for non-Westerners (FExpectation = 0.86, p = .36, η
2
 = .0026).
15
 As the mean of the two 
conditions that expected absurdity was higher than that of the two conditions that did not,
16
 this 
suggests that the effect of Expectation is stronger for Westerners than for non-Westerners, 
though this cultural difference was not statistically significant, as indicated by the previous 
analysis. This might be because Westerners find the logical violations more inherently 
threatening due to their more rigid cognitive style.  
It is not clear from these results exactly how culture affects perception of absurdity, but 
we do have some preliminary results to suggest that cultural differences may exist: Westerners 
were found to rate absurd jokes as slightly funnier than non-Westerners. Additionally, the effect 
of expecting absurdity was found to be statistically significant for Westerners, but not for non-
Westerners. In order to properly investigate the role of culture, a future study should sample 
groups of North Americans and East Asians. Ratings of absurd jokes could then be compared, as 
can the two groups’ relationships with various individual differences and contextual effects (i.e., 
Expectation and Intention).  
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 Expectation was not a significant main effect for either group when first funniness rating was included as the 
dependent variable. 
16
 MExpected = 2.89, MUnexpected = 2.44. 
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Intention to share. Participants were asked to report how likely they would be to share 
with friends each of the absurd jokes they saw. We conceived of this item as being similar to 
ratings of funniness, as both should be an indication of the level of appreciation for the joke. As 
shown in Table 7, intention to share and funniness do have a strong, positive correlation (  = .63, 
p < .01). Funniness, however, may be a concept closely related to traditional forms of humour 
and the explicit action of laughter. The absurd jokes presented in this study are very different 
from traditional humour and, in the context of completing an online study, participants may have 
been unlikely to generate much laughter. Therefore, intention to share may serve as an indicator 
of appreciation or entertainment separate from standard notions of humour. Furthermore, it is an 
indication of a real-world social behaviour, one that becomes more relevant as content-sharing 
becomes an integral part of popular social media platforms (Lee, Park, & Han, 2014). Intention 
to share is also a particularly-relevant metric of appreciation for these items, as Twitter allows 
users to “retweet” Tweets, sharing that Tweet with one’s followers and displaying it on one’s 
page. Given that intention to share and ratings of funniness likely reflect similar sorts of 
appreciation, we would make the same predictions about the effects of expectation of absurdity 
and perceived intention to be funny on intention to share as we have on that of funniness ratings. 
That is, intention to share will be higher when absurdity is expected and when an intention to be 
funny is perceived. Furthermore, the effect of intention to be funny on intention to share will be 
lower when absurdity is not expected. 
Descriptive statistics for ratings of intention to share are provided in Table 1. As with 
ratings of funniness, conditions differ in the predicted directions: intention to share is lowest 
when an intention to be funny is perceived and highest when an intention to be funny is 
perceived and absurdity is expected. However, these mean differences are very small and are not 
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necessarily indicative of stable effects. A 2 (Expectation) x 2 (Intention) ANOVA was run with 
ratings of intention to share as the dependent variable. There were no significant main effects 
(FExpectation(1, 423) = 1.44, p = .23, η
2
 = .004; FIntention(1, 423) = 0.087, p = .77, η
2
 = .0002). The 
interaction term was also not significant (FE*I(1, 428) = 1.17, p = .28, η
2
 = .003). There is no 
evidence for an effect of expectation of absurdity or perceived intention to be funny on intention 
to share absurd jokes. These findings are in line with the results of our ANOVA when using 
mean funniness ratings as our dependent variable.  
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Discussion 
 This study investigated the effects of expecting absurdity and perceived intention to be 
funny on the perception of humour in absurd jokes. Participants were either told that they would 
encounter absurd stimuli or were given no information about expectation. Similarly, participants 
were either told that the stimuli were intended to be funny or were given no information about 
intentionality. Each participant then rated how humorous they found three absurd jokes. The 
effect of expectation, intention, and individual difference variables was examined, along with 
their interactions.  
Expectation 
We hypothesised that expecting absurdity would reduce the amount of threat experienced 
upon encountering it, allowing one to process it as a benign threat and perceive it as funnier. This 
was only partially supported by our data. Mean differences in funniness ratings indicated that 
expecting absurdity did increase perceptions of humour.
 17
 This was also confirmed by the 
ANOVA carried out on the first humour rating participants made, although the effect of 
Expectation was small. However, the effect of Expectation did not reach threshold for statistical 
significance when the mean funniness rating for all 3 jokes was examined. Thus, our concern 
that new expectations would form after encountering the first target and that these expectations 
would override the manipulation appear valid, as the effect of Expectation was stronger when 
only the first stimulus was analysed. 
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 This was found to be true both of the first funniness rating and the mean funniness rating. Mean funniness rating: 
MExpected = 2.70, MNoExpectation = 2.47. First funniness rating: MExpected = 2.69, MNoExpectation = 2.36. 
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Although the effect was small, the finding that absurd jokes are rated as funnier when 
they are expected to be absurd is in line with findings in past work (i.e., Warren & McGraw, 
2016) and the predictions of the Benign Violation Theory. These results also contradict the 
common notion that surprise is a crucial element of humour (Nerhardt, 1976), as mitigating the 
surprise of encountering something absurd increased perceptions of humour. Thus, in the case of 
absurd humour, surprise may contribute to perceived threat, thereby reducing perception of 
humour. Notably, these findings differ from those of Proulx and colleagues (2010), who found 
no differences in humour ratings based on whether absurdity was expected. However, their null 
finding may have been due to the stimulus they used, which made use of a variety of types of 
humour besides absurd. Expecting absurdity may have a different impact on the perception of 
these other types of humour, potentially reducing the apparent effect of Expectation.  
However, even considering only this first rating, the effect is still much weaker than we 
anticipated. This may be due to a number of reasons. First, it is possible that our manipulations 
of expectation and intention were not strong enough. A high number of participants were 
removed prior to analysis for being unable to either accurately describe the manipulation in their 
own words or recognise the manipulation in a multiple choice question. Those who remained 
were successful in both manipulation checks, which indicates that some participants did correctly 
process the manipulation (as best we can discern). Still, the fact that such a large number of 
participants did not pass the manipulation checks suggests that our manipulation was not very 
successful and as a result this manipulation also seems unlikely to have been impactful. 
Furthermore, it is possible that even those who were able to correctly parrot the instructions and 
then recognise them later may not have processed the instructions deeply and meaningfully. This 
is likely because students are so used to taking survey-format studies and are seldom forced to 
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pay much attention to the instructions. Even when encouraged to attend to them, subtle text-
based instructions may not be sufficiently impactful for this manipulation. A stronger induction 
of expectation may be necessary in order to elicit stronger effects. For example, the manipulation 
could instead provide an example of absurdity as the first target with the assumption that an 
expectation of absurdity would then be induced for the second target.  
 Another possibility is that our stimuli were too threatening to be perceived as funny for 
many participants, even when the absurdity was expected. These stimuli are highly popular 
Tweets from a relatively large community on Twitter
18
. That said, this type of humour is still 
rather niche and it may be that the meaning violation present is still perceived as malign by 
many, even when it is expected. This possibility is at least partially-supported by the data: the 
overall mean funniness rating was 2.57, which is below the scale’s midpoint at 4 (labeled 
“Moderately Funny”). Mean funniness ratings were also somewhat negatively skewed, with 61 
participants (14%) rating the funniness of all three targets as a 1. In order to address this concern, 
we could re-run the study using stimuli that have less severe meaning violations and thus induce 
a lower level of threat. Expecting absurdity might then lower threat sufficiently to allow more 
participants to perceive the jokes as funny.  
 Future studies should also focus on identifying the mechanism for the relationship 
between expectation of absurdity and the mirth response to absurd jokes. As per the Benign 
Violation Theory of humour, we have conceived of this relationship as mediated by the 
experienced level of threat; absurdity that is expected is less jarring, induces less uncertainty, and 
is thus less threatening. However, this possible mechanism has not been directly examined in this 
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 For example, Twitter user “@dril,” who wrote one of our stimuli, has approximately 345,000 followers.  
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study. In order to address this, threat would have to be measured and analysed as a possible 
mediator. 
Intention to Be Funny 
We predicted that a perceived intention to be funny would increase humour ratings of 
absurd jokes. Understanding a meaning violation as something trivial—“just a joke”—should 
help to reduce its threat to a level where it is benign and thus potentially funny. We also 
predicted that perceived intention to be funny would operate differently depending on whether 
absurdity was expected. Because a perceived intention to be funny may create the expectation of 
traditional humour, it may make encountering an absurd joke even more jarring, thus increasing 
perceived threat and lowering the likelihood of perceiving it as funny. In contrast, when 
absurdity is expected, perceiving it as intending to be funny helps to reduce the threat of the 
meaning violation and encourages the perception of humour. These predictions were only 
partially supported by the data. Condition differences in funniness ratings support both these 
predictions. First, the mean funniness rating for the two conditions where an intention to be 
funny was not perceived (Control and Absurd) was lower than the mean of the two conditions 
where it was (Funny and Absurd/Funny).
19
 Second, ratings of funniness were lowest when an 
intention to be funny was perceived but absurdity was not expected. They were also highest 
when both an intention to be funny was perceived and absurdity was expected.
20
 However, these 
differences were very small and neither the main effect of Intention, nor the interaction between 
Expectation and Intention were statistically significant in the ANOVA. One possible explanation 
is that the stimuli used may be too threatening for intention to be funny to render it benign. Even 
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 Mean funniness rating: MIntended = 2.61, MNoIntentions = 2.54. First funniness rating: MIntended = 2.53, MNoIntentions = 
2.48. 
20
 Both findings held for both the first funniness rating and the mean funniness rating. 
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if threat has been reduced, the meaning violation may still be too severe to be perceived as funny 
for many participants. Alternatively, it may be that knowing something is intended to be funny 
does not lower the perceived threat of absurdity. Although we had conceived of it as encouraging 
participants to view the target as trivial, it may only draw a contrast between what is commonly 
viewed as funny and the unpleasantness of experiencing a meaning violation. In this way, it 
might uniformly invite an unfavourable comparison with traditional humour, regardless of 
whether absurdity is expected. It may also be that intention is not an important determinant in the 
perception of absurdity. This would seem to be consistent with the results of Proulx and 
colleagues (2010), who found no influence of expectation and intention (combined).  
Understanding the influence of expectation and intention is complicated somewhat by the 
results of the regressions. These models included as predictors our Expectation manipulation, 
Intention, a single individual difference measure, and all possible 2-way interaction terms. The 
majority of these found the interaction between Expectation and Intention to be a small but 
statistically significant positive effect.
21
 Thus, when certain individual differences are controlled, 
the effect of Intention increases when absurdity is expected, as predicted. Notably, this 
interaction provides another possible explanation for why the main effect of Intention was not 
significant in our ANOVA. These two opposite effects effectively cancel one another out, 
rendering the main effect of Intention null. Interpretation of this effect is further complicated by 
the contradictory nature of the simple effects of Intention. We predicted that perceived intention 
to be funny would decrease ratings of humour when absurdity is not expected because that 
perception would create an expectation of traditional humour, making absurd humour even more 
jarring. This pattern is only present in some of the models in which the Expectation-Intention 
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 All models using the first funniness rating as the DV found the E-I interaction significant, while only some 
models using the mean funniness rating did. Refer to Results section for detailed list. 
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interaction was significant. Although the observed change in the effect of Intention based on 
level of Expectation is in line with our prediction in some models (e.g., when Openness is 
included in the model), a change in the opposite direction from what was predicted was observed 
in other models (e.g., when Intolerance for Uncertainty was included in the model). These 
conflicting results are not a strong source of evidence for our account of how the effect of 
Intention should change based on expectations, although there is evidence that the effect does 
change.   
It should be noted that this interaction effect is smaller than anticipated and conditional 
on controlling for individual differences. It is unclear, however, why this interaction only 
emerges when these individual differences are controlled for. It is possible that the change in the 
effect of Intention based on level of Expectation is partially-predicated on these individual 
differences. Although we did not include the three-way interaction term in our models, this might 
account for the masking of the interaction effect when individual differences were not included 
in the model. As for theoretical reasons that the interaction between Expectation and Intention 
would be masked by such a variety of individual differences, it is difficult to speculate. Although 
some of these measures were similar, many of them differed considerably from one another and 
very few of them are significant predictors of ratings of funniness, so there is no clear reason 
why they should all act in the same way to mask the Expectation-Intention interaction. 
It is difficult to form strong conclusions about the relationship between perceived 
intention to be funny and the perception of absurd humour from these conflicting results. 
Evidently, the interaction effect we predicted has some role in the perception of humour in 
absurdity. However, it is difficult to confidently identify that role given such varied results, and 
additional studies are required to produce more definitive answers. Future studies should use 
EXPECTATION, INTENTION, AND ABSURDITY 48 
absurd jokes with less severe meaning violations in order to increase the likelihood that 
manipulations of intention and expectation can render them benign. If the Expectation-Intention 
interaction is indeed authentic, the specific mechanism should be investigated. Although we 
posited that it could be expectation of traditional humour created by a perceived intention to be 
funny that leads to lower ratings of humour when absurdity is not expected, this has not been 
explicitly shown in the current study and would have to be confirmed by examining if intentions 
to be funny spontaneously elicit expectations of traditional humour. 
Individual Differences 
A number of predictions were made about the role of individual differences in the 
perception of absurd jokes, both as predictors and as moderators of other effects. Namely, we 
hypothesised that traits related to an appreciation for novelty (e.g., Openness, Need for 
Cognition) would predict higher humour ratings and traits related to intolerance for rule violation 
(e.g., Conscientiousness) would predict lower humour ratings. We also predicted that the effect 
of Expectation would be lower in individuals either high in appreciation for novelty or low in 
intolerance for rule violation. Finally, we predicted that the effect of Intention would also be 
reduced in individuals low in traits related to intolerance for rule violation. Generally, these 
predictions were unsupported by the data. It is not immediately clear why the individual 
differences measured did not successfully predict perception of humour in absurd jokes, as many 
of these measures seem closely related to aspects of absurd humour. For example: absurd jokes 
deal heavily in ambiguity and uncertainty. Traits that describe a dislike for these aspects of 
absurd humour should negatively predict perception of humour but no such relationship is 
supported in the data. One potential explanation that has already been raised is that these stimuli 
were too threatening to be rendered benign for most participants. It may be that only those 
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individuals extremely tolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty can appreciate these stimuli and we 
were unable to capture this demographic adequately enough to illustrate this relationship. Less 
severe meaning violations may be necessary in order to properly explore the relationship 
between perception of absurd humour and individual differences. What these results mean for 
individual differences that are more distally-related to absurd humour is also unclear. Openness, 
for example, describes an appreciation for novelty and creativity. Although absurd humour tends 
to be replete with both, it may be that other aspects of absurd humour supplant the appeal that 
these jokes would have for individuals high in Openness. Namely, the threat inherent in absurd 
humour and one’s perception of that threat may render Openness irrelevant. In other words, how 
you feel about the creativity and novelty in absurd humour could be secondary to how 
threatening you perceive the meaning violations therein to be. 
It should be noted, however, that these results are at odds with previous findings in our 
lab. In an unpublished study, we had participants rate the funniness of variety of absurd targets, 
including Twitter jokes, aphorisms, jokes written by children, aberrant proverbs, and computer-
generated nonsense. Funniness ratings were found to be moderately negatively correlated with 
Conscientiousness (r = -.22, p = .002, N = 189; Quinlan & Mar, unpublished data). It is possible 
that the relationship between Conscientiousness and funniness ratings exists for some of these 
target categories but not absurd Twitter jokes. Although the correlation does still hold in these 
data when only participants who saw absurd Twitter jokes are included, the sample size is too 
small to be confident in the results (r = -.39, p = .017, N = 36; Quinlan & Mar, unpublished 
data). The contradictory nature of these findings makes it difficult to make any firm conclusions 
about the role of individual differences in the perception of absurd humour. Although we have 
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evidence that it does play some role, future studies and more concrete results are necessary to be 
confident in any conclusion. 
Conclusion 
Although the results of this study were largely inconclusive, there were some notable 
findings. First, expecting absurdity does indeed increase funniness ratings of an absurd joke. We 
believe that expecting absurdity reduces the threat of the absurd joke and, as per the Benign 
Violation Theory of humour (McGraw & Warren, 2010), this reduction of threat allows 
participants to view the target as funnier. This effect was small, however, and it may have been 
that targets were too threatening for Expectation to have a stronger impact on how they were 
perceived. We anticipated that knowing that the texts were intended to be funny would increase 
humour when absurdity was also expected, but decrease humour when absurdity was not 
expected. This pattern was visible in the condition differences of funniness ratings, but these 
differences were only statistically significant when certain individual differences were controlled 
for, and the effect remained small. This suggests that perceived intention to be funny does 
increase the threat of an absurd target when absurdity is not expected, possibly because it creates 
the expectation of traditional humour which makes the absurd joke more jarring. None of the 
predicted relationships between funniness ratings and individual differencs were found. 
Preliminary exploratory results suggest that Westerners and non-Westerners may perceive absurd 
jokes differently, although this requires further exploration in a dedicated study. Future studies 
should also address a number of the design issues discussed herein: namely, the potentially low 
impact of our manipulations and the difficulties with identifying participants who properly 
processed the manipulation.   
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Figure 1. Mean ratings of funniness by condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2. First funniness ratings by condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Appendix A 
Absurd jokes taken from Weird Twitter. 
 For sale: car. Does not stop. You will have to jump in as I jump out. I have been driving 
this car for three years. Please help me. 
 Putting cool gothic steeples everywhere was my trademark as an architect and I'll be 
damned if I change that now that I'm a plastic surgeon. 
 The chief put my gun and badge in the paper shredder but it just broke the paper 
shredder. 
 Forgot my iPod so I'm just beatboxing on the bus. Driver is breakdancing in the aisle. 
Bus is going crazy right now. We haven't moved in 2 hours. 
 If your grave doesn't say "rest in peace" on it you are automatically drafted into the 
skeleton war. 
 Hour 7 of refusing to say "when" as Mom spoons more and more mashed potatoes onto 
my plate. Grandma crying, uncles yelling, I will not yield. 
 100 percent of survey respondents said: help us get out of this tall tree. We didn’t know 
this survey involved being stuck in a tree. 
 I'd be extra scared if a break-in occurred while I was in the shower and the burglar saw 
me in there, fully clothed and eating my soup. 
 It’s reductive to describe my new website, hoogle, as “just google for horses.” 
 A wise old man told me the things that matter the most are the things that matter the least, 
later we found out he was just a pile of hair. 
